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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
)

SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD,
PETITIONER

)

vs.

}

E. L. MAXWELL, WARDEN,
STATE OF OHIO, ex re 1. ,

No.

6640

}

)

RESPONDENTS
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
I.

DID THE PUBLICITY RELATING TO THE PETITIONER DEPRIVE
HIM OF A FAIR TRIAL?

There are two periods of time which must be examined to
determine whether or not petitioner was prejudiced by the publicity
involved in this case.

Those two periods are:

1.

the period of

time between the discovery of the murder and the impanelling of the
jury, and 2.

the period of time between the impanelling of the jury

and the return of its verdict of guilty.
A. BEFORE TRIAL
With respect to the period of time prior to the final impanelling
of the jury, pages 20 and 21 of the petitioner's petition for a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio set forth headlines
appearing in Cleveland newspapers for approximately three weeks after the
murder on July 4, 1954.

Despite the alleged sensationalistic nature of

the journalistic effort, the major thrust of the articles and editorials
was to seek the arrest of the chief suspect, Dr. Samuel Sheppard.

Further,

these alleged prejudicial headlines occurred about ten weeks prior to

the commencement of the trial on October 18, 1954.
No one can doubt the effect of such a sustained and unremitting journalistic effort.

Any incident which receives a dis-

portionate amount of publicity loses its footing in terms of eva1uation within an objective context.
be decided.

Yet, this is not the issue to

The objectivity of the press is not the standard.

The

guideline which has been laid down by the United States Supreme Court
is:

"To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an
accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the
presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality
would be to establish an impossible standard. It
is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on
the evidence presented in court. 11 (Irvin v. Dowd,
366 u. s. 717' 723 ( 1961)).
An examination of the Irvin case and the case of

Rideau~·

State of Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S. Ct., 1417, 10 L. Ed. 2d, 663
(1963), (perhaps the two cases most favorable to petitioner's position)
wi 11 reveal where the United States Supreme Court has drawn the boundaries for what constitutes a fair trial in the face of adverse publicity.
In the Irvin case, supra, the following characteristics are observed:
1.

It was a small community (30,000);

2.

There were six brutal murders in the vicinity;

3.

There was vast coverage by news media;

4.

There was never any expressions as to doubt concerning
the defendant's guilt;

5.

Prior criminal record of the accused was published;
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6.

A confession by the defendant was given wide play;

7.

Ninety per cent of the 370 prospective jurors entertained so~e opinion as to guilt ranging from mere
suspicion to absolute certainty;

8.

Eight of the twelve jurors expressed the opinion that
the defendant was guilty;

9.

A pattern of deep and bitter prejudice existed throughout the community.

The factors surrounding the Rideau case are as follows:
1.

It was a relatively small community (150,000);

2.

Vast coverage by the news media;

3.

Two of the jurors were law enforcement officials;

4. A television tape was run three times to audiences
of 24,000, 53,000, and 29,000 which showed the defendant confessing in detai 1 to the crimes;

5.

At the time of the confession the defendant had no
counse 1.

Such a pattern of facts reveals the situation that caused the
United States Supreme Court to reverse both convictions.
At page 666 of the Rideau case, supra, the Court characterized
the television coverage prior to the trial as "Rideau's trial."

Yet,

the court is not necessarily condemning "pub 1i city per se"; the court
is condemning publicity of such a prejudicial nature that the entire
area from which the venire wi 11 be drawn is so saturated with biased
information concerning the offense and the past record of the petitioner
that it can be said the defendant was "tried" and found gui 1ty before he
reached the courtroom.
The State of Ohio contends that such was not the case in the
Sheppard case.

Cleveland is not a town of thirty or one hundred and

fifty thousand people.

It was a cosmopolitan goliath of some 914,000

- 3-

people according to the 1950 census.

In the Sheppard case

there had not been six brutal murders or several crimes.

The

entire community was not then convinced that Dr. Sheppard had
done away with his wife.

This is to be contrasted with the

general community belief of guilt in the Irvin and Rideau cases.
In the Irvin case, the fact that the accused had a criminal record
was spread throughout the community.

Here there is some parallel

with the Sheppard case but it is far different for one to have
been convicted of a crime than to have been accused of marital
infidelity.

The reports appearing in 1he papers were not one

sided as in the Rideau and Irvin Cases, supra.

As a matter of

fact, reports appeared in the papers declaring the innocence of the
pe ti ti oner.

"The pe ti ti oner's 'own story' was headlined in unus ua l1 y

bold type on the front page of one Cleveland daily prior to trial."
(Exhibit 1, page 10)
In both the Rideau and Irvin cases the invidious influence
of a confession was involved.

Whereas, Dr. Sheppard contended

throughout the entire investigation and trial that he was innocent.
The tremendous weight that a confession played in the prior cases
is apparent.
"For we hold that it was a denial of due
process of law to refuse the request for a change
of venue, after the people of Calcasieu Parish had
been exposed repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle
of Rideau personally confessing in detai 1 to the
crimes with which he was later to be charged. For
anyone who has ever watched television the conclusion cannot be avoided that this spectacle, to the
tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it,
in a very real sense was Rideau's trial -- at which
he pleaded guilty to murder. Any subsequent court
proceeding in a community so pervasively exposed to

- 4 -

such a spectacle could be but a hollow formal! ty. 11
Rideau, id., at page 665.
All of the above factors suggest that the deep-rooted
prejudice that existed in the Rideau and Irvin cases did not
exist in the Sheppard case.
This conclusion is borne out by the results that can be
derived from an analysis of

the~

dire examination.

Counsel

for the petitioner at the trial stage summed up the results of
the

!'.2!L

dire examination by stating at page 1352 of the record:

;': -J: ;': A11
the people si tti ng on the
jury with the exception of Mrs. Borke, Juror No. 2,
have read about this case, a great many have heard
radio and television, and we sti 11 maintain that
even though they express no opinion, that human
nature is such that they cannot help but be effected
by the situation presented from the beginning of
this -- the happening of this murder down to the
present time. 11
(Emphasis added)
11

Since the voir dire examination disclosed that there would
be no deep-rooted prejudice prevalent in the community against him,
the

juro~did

not have a fixed opinion as to guilt, and that petitioner

cannot claim that the publicity his case received prior to the impanelling
of the jury deprived him of a fair trial. The Supreme Court of the
United States has suggested that if an accused is tried by a jury
which has no fixed opinion as to the guilt of the accused, then
such a jury far exceeds the standard established in the Irvin case,
supra.
"Although most of the persons selected for
the trial jury had been exposed to some of the publicity related above, each individual indicated that
he was not biased, that he had formed no opinion as
to petitioner's guilt which would require evidence
to remove, and that he would enter the trial with an

-5-

open mind disregarding anything he had read on
the case.
A study of the voi r di re indicates clearly
that each jurors' qualifications as to impartiality
far exceeded the minimum standards this Court established in its earlier cases as well as in Irvin
~·c ~·: ·k. 11
Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 557,
8 L Ed 2d 98, 111, 82 S. Ct. 955 (1962).
11

The trial judge, exercising his discretion, went forward
with the task of impanelling the jury.
815 (1962).

Rizzo~·

U.S., 304 F. 2d 810,

No where in the record is it revealed that any of those

who sat on the jury had formed a fixed opinion as to the gui It of
the accused.

After an examination of the relevant factors surround-

ing the Sheppard jury and the publicity in the community, respondent
finds that it can merely repeat the words of the United States District Court in United States v. Kahaner, 204 F. Supp. 921, 924
(1962):
"Pub 1i ci ty, in and of ~ tse 1f does not, forec 1os ea fair trial. The courts do not function in
a vacuum and jurors are not required to be totally
ignorant of what goes on about them. ·k * ~·c
11

It is clear that the Supreme Court of Ohio used the same
test set forth in the Beck case, supra, in order to ascertain
whether petitioner could receive a fair trial.

Quoting from

Exhibit four, page three of the Ohio Supreme Court opinion:
"The examination of jurors in their voir
dire affords the best test as to whether or not
prejudice exists in the community against the defendant; and where it appears that the opinion as
to the guilt of the defendant of those called for
examination for jurors are based on newspaper articles and that the opinions so formed are not
fixed but would yield readily to evidence, it is
not error to over rule an application for a change
of venue. 11

- 6 -
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This statement has been supported by numerous federal cases.
"The on 1y p rac ti cal way to conduct a c ri mi na l
trial with reasonable certainty that the jury wi 11
be uninfluenced by publicity is by careful examination of the jurors in the first instance, and a constant repetition of the admonition to the jurors not
to receive any outside information about the case,
followed by inquiry to insure that the instructions
are obeyed." U.S. y_. Kline, 205 F. Supp 776, 786
( 1963).
'~hether or not the publicity has been of
such a nature that the selection of a fair and impartial jury is foreclosed at this time can not be
determined unti 1 the jurors are questioned on voir
dire."
U.S. v. Kahaner, 204 F. Supp 921 at 924
(1962).

Thus, we see in examining the period of time between the
discovery of the murder and the impanelling of the jury, the publicity petitioner received did not deprive him of a fair trial.

A comment is deemed necessary at this time with respect to
the issue petitioner raises relating to the publication of a list
of veniremen thirty days in advance of trial, any possible prejudice
resulting therefrom would have been disclosed during the voir dire
examination and counsel for petitioner could have had such prospective juror removed from the case.

Accordingly this issue has

no merit.
Further, petitioner failed to raise this issue on appeal
(Exhibit 1) and thus such issue is not properly before this Court.

- 7 -

B.

DURING TRIAL

The petitioner has also asserted that during the period
of time between the impanelling of the jury and the return of its
verdict of guilty, he was deprived of a fair trial because of four
incidents which occurred, to wit:
1)

during the trial, newspaper

pictures were taken inside

the home of an alternate juror, showing how the family fared while
the juror was at court;
2)

a broadcast by Walter Winchell relating a story of a

woman who claimed she was the mistress of petitioner and that he
was responsible for the birth of a chi Id;
3)

a broadcast by Bob ConsidLne who announced over the

radio a comparison between Alger Hiss and the petitioner;
4)

the appearance in the newspaper, November 24, 196"1\ of

a double-column headline on the front page as follows:

"SAM CALLED A JEKYLL-HYDE BY MARILYN,
COUSIN TO TESTIFY"
In considering the above-mentioned complaints it is necessary to keep in mind the following legal principles:
The mere fact of unfavorable publicity does not of itself
raise a presumption of prejudice but prejudice must manifest itself
so as to corrupt due process.

Dennis~·

U.S., 302 F 2d 5 (1962).

Mere exposure to adverse publicity does not necessarily result in
bias, prejudgment or other disqualification.
206 F. Supp. 686, 687 (1962).

U.S.~·

Applegarth,

The mere fact that a juror has read

newspaper accounts relative to a criminal charge is not in itself
sufficient grounds for excusing a jury.
F. 2d 46, 51 ( 1960) •

- 8 -

Blumenfield y. U.S., 284

~
.·.: ..
'

With respect to the newspaper pictures taken inside the
home of an alternate juror, respondent contends that the trial judge
adequately disposed of this point when he stated in his memorandum
on motion for a new trial, Exhibit 1, page 9:
'~hatever the legal or ethical considerations,
the incident proved to be a nullity in this case. The
juror (Mrs. Mancini) was an alternate juror; her services were not finally needed; she was discharged at
the close of the presentation of the court's charge
to the jury and took no part whatever in the jury's
deliberations or the rendition of the verdict. There
is not a suggestion that Mrs. Mancini was influenced
in any manner, nor that she even knew of the matter at
that time. It certainly cannot be claimed that the
other jurors cared anything about it, nor is it even
c 1aimed that they knew of i t."

With regard to the broadcast by Walter Winchell relating the
story of a woman who claimed to be the mistress of petitioner, respondent avers that this report could not have resulted in any substantial
prejudice to petitioner.

There had already been presented into evi-

dence testimony to the effect that petitioner had been having extramarital relations with other women, Miss Susan Hayes in particular
(page 4846 of the record).

Further, the jury had been admonished

not to consider any reports which they heard outside the courtroom.
Also at page 5429 of the record it is indicated that only two of the
jurors heard the broadcast and that both of those jurors stated it
would not have any effect upon their judgment.
Bob Considine said that the denial of guilt by the petitioner
to a police officer and the denial of Alger Hiss when he was confronted
by Whittaker Chambers was in the same category.
This comparison did not convey to the jurors any information
they did not receive in the trial.

The police officer testified on

- 9 -
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the witness stand about petitioner's denial of guilt.

All that

was related to the jury was a fact situation, presented in evidence,
and Mr. Considine's inference therefrom.

Merely because Mr. Considine

drew a particular inference does not necessarily mean the juror's
would draw the same inference.

Surely, this one broadcast is not

enough to affirmatively show petitioner was deprived of a fair trial
by impartial jurors.

The presumption would seem to be that jurors

are far more likely to rely on testimony that takes place before their
eyes than the inanities of this particular newscaster.
Petitioner has also claimed that a broadcast by Bob Considine
who announced over the radio a comparison between Alger Hiss and
the petitioner resulted in prejudice to him.

Since the court did

not question the jurors to see who had heard that report, respondent
wi 11 assume the position that even if all the jurors heard that presentation, it did not result in prejudice to the petitioner.
Again, it must be kept in mind that the trial court had consistently admonished the jury not to consider out-of-court declarations
relating to the case.

In connection with this point it is important

to note that our jury system is based upon the assumption that juries
wi 11 endeavor to follow the Court's instructions.

Delli Paoli y. United

States, 352 U.S. 232, 242, 77 S. Ct. 294, 1 L. Ed 2d, 278 (1957).

And

as was stated in Holt y. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 31 S. Ct. 2, 54
L. Ed., 1021 (1910) at 251:

"If the mere opportunity for prejudice or
corruption is to raise a presumption that they exist, it wi 11 be hard to maintain jury trial under
the conditions of the present day . 11

- JO -
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Petitioner has further claimed that the appearance in the
newspaper of November 24, 1954, of a double-column headline asserting
that a cousin was to testify that Sam was called a Jekyll-Hyde by
Marilyn prejudiced him.

Petitioner further asserts that no such

testimony was presented at the trial in support of that allegation.
Page 4266 of the record discloses that the above newspaper
article was presented to the Court in support of a motion for continuance of the case.

It is important to note that counsel for the

petitioner did not request the Court to examine the jurors to see
if they had read or seen that particular article.

Counsel only

moved that a continuance of the case be granted.

Since it is to

be presumed that the juror's followed the Court's instructions,
Delli Paoli, supra, and did not read any information relating to
the case which was given outside the courtroom, it is clear that
a reason for a continuance of the case was not existant.

Only by

an examination of the individual jurors would it be ascertained
whether a juror had read the newspaper article.

Since counsel

for petitioner did not affirmatively show, either at the trial
by requesting the Court to examine the jurors as to the prejudicial
effect of the article or in this habeas corpus proceeding by an
affidavit demonstrating the adverse effect of that article, respondent maintains that the petitioner has not sustained his burden
of proving he was prejudiced at his trial.
Accordingly, respondent urges this Court to reject this
particular claim of the petitioner as the United States Supreme Court
rejected the claims of Stroble in the case of Stroble_y. California,

343 U.S. 181, 195, 96 L. ed 872, 883, 72 S.Ct. 599 (1952) when they
held:

- 11 -
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Indeed, at no stage of the proceedings
has petitioner offered so much as an affidavit
to prove that any juror was in fact prejudiced
by the newspaper stories. He asks this Court
simply to read those stories and then to declare,
over the contrary findings of two state courts,
that they necessarily deprived him of due process.
That we cannot do, at least where, as here, the
inflammatory newspaper accounts appeared approximately six weeks before the beginning of petitioner1s trial, and there is no affirmative showing
that any community prejudice ever existed or in
any way affected the deliberations of the jury."
11

It should be noted that there was a revival of publicity
in the Stroble case, supra, as the trial commenced (343 U.S. at
193, 96 L. ed.,

at 882).

Thus to that extent the Stroble case

is on all fours with the case at bar.
In conclusion, respondent maintains that the petitioner
has not affirmatively shown that he was deprived of a fair trial
due to the publicity his case received both prior to and subsequent
to the impanelling of the jury.

It is clear that one who seeks to

have a federal court set aside a state criminal conviction has 11 the
burden of showing essential unfairness ***not as a matter of
speculation but as a demonstrable reality. 11
Darcy~·

Handy,

3~

U.S.

United States, ex rel.

454, 462, 76 S.Ct. 965, 100 L. ed. 1331

(1956).
Further, it should be kept in mind that

11

the trial judge has

a large discretion in ruling on the issue of prejudice from the reading
by jurors of news articles concerning the trial. 11

Marshall v. United

States, 360 U.S. 310, 312, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L. ed 2d 1250 (1959).
Also, while the Supreme Court has a supervisory power over
federal judicial proceedings, it has stated there is "a duty of preference to the authority of the State over local administration of
justice.

11

- 12 -
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And finally, the question whether jurors are impartial in
the constitutional sense is one of mixed law and fact as to which
the challenger has the burden of persuasion, for:

"Unless he shows

the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror
as wi 11 raise the presumption of partiality, the juror need not
necessarily be set aside •r •r •r."

Reynolds y_. United States, 98

U.S. 145, 157, 25 L.ed. 244, quoted with approval in Irvin y. Dowd,
supra.
With reference to the fact the jurors were allowed to go
to their homes each night during the trial and were not sequestered
unti 1 after the Court's charge, it has been held that whether to
keep the jury together in the trial of a capital case is discretionary, and that the trial court's action in that respect wi 11
not be reviewed, unless it appears affirmatively that prejudice
resulted to the defendant.

Wheeler y_. U.S., 165 F. 2d 225 (1947),

cert. denied. 68 S. Ct. 448, 333 U.S. 829, 92 L. ed 1115;
Hudspeth, 189 F. 2d 300 (1951).

~

y_.

Further, petitioner has not shown

that he requested that the jury be sequestered during the trial
or that the jury was not properly instructed prior to separation.

- 13 -
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THE PETITIONER DEPRIVED OF A "PUBLIC" TRIAL?

The petitioner has asserted that the action of the trial
court in setting aside the major portion of the courtroom for
representatives of the news media was violative of his right to
a "public 11 trial.
Respondent contends that the trial court was justified
in its actions and that the Court's reasons as set forth in his
memorandum on motion for new trial (Exhibit 1, pages 6 & 7) adequately explain his behavior:
Rea li zing that the case had caught the pub1i c imagination to an extent leading national and,
indeed, international news media to decide to fully
11
cover 11 the trial, and having requests for space
from many of them, the court decided to make proper
arrangements before trial and to control the situation so as to minimize and, if possible, eliminate
confusion during the trial. The courtroom is small.
The court assigned specific seats to individual correspondents in the rear of the courtroom and back of
the trial area, and issued orders that there was to
be no crowding or congregating at the front end entrances (one on each side of the bench) of the courtroom; that there was to be no passing back and forth
through trial area and that all entries to and movings
out of the courtroom be via the public doorway in the
rear of the courtroom. Members of the defendant's
family were accommodated with seats at all times dur~
ing the trial. The same was accorded members of the
family of the murdered Marilyn. Members of the general public were admitted to the extent of the seating
capacity of the courtroom and a scheme of rotation was
established so that many persons attended some sessions
of the trial and no favored members of the general public were present at all times, nor permitted to be. 11
11

The size of the courtroom is 52 feet by 21 feet.

In order

to accomodate all classes of persons, the petitioner's family, the
deceased's family, the press, and the general public, certain arrangements had to be made.

At all times there were representatives from
- 14 -

each of the above classes present in the courtroom.

Thus the

trial was not, by the order of the trial court, rendered a secret trial, but was even more so a public trial than most trials
are.

The Court of Appeals held with respect to this issue:
"It is claimed also that the court arranged
the courtroom to accomodate a great many representatives
of the press, radio and television and other news-disseminating agencies, thus restricting accommodations
avai !able for others. The record shows that the defendant's family was provided for and that the defendants brother Dr. Stephen Sheppard, although a witness,
was permitted by order of the court to remain in the
courtroom throughout the trial. The court in this
case was presented with a very difficult matter because
of the unusual amount of coverage attempted by the press,
radio and television agencies. The arrangements made by
the court were within its sound discretion. Certainly
the defendant was afforded a public trial, and from a
reading of the record, we cannot say that the court in
seeking to maintain an orderly proceeding abused its
discretion in directing the courtroom arrangements."
(Exhibit 2, page 36)
In connection with this issue it should be noted that the

Sixth Amendment's guaranty of a "public" trial in criminal cases
does not apply to trials in state criminal prosecutions.
~·Washington,
Phillips~·

Gaines

277 U.S. 81, 72 L. ed 793, 48 S. Ct. 468 (1928);

Nash, 311 F. 2d 513 (1962).

And in

Melanson~·

O'Brien,

191 F. 2d 963 (1951) it was declared that in determining whether one
convicted of a crime in a state court at a trial from which the public
was excluded is denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, decisions of the federal courts dealing with the right to a
public trial in a federal criminal prosecution are not controlling,
as the question whether the exclusion of the general public from the
courtroom is a violation of the specific guaranty of a "public trial"
contained in the Sixth Amendment is different from the question of
- 15 -

whether such an exclusion is a violation of the more general
guaranty of due process of law in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Further, in considering whether the petitioner was deprived of a "public" trial the case of Levine y_. United States,
362 U.S. 610, 4 L. ed 2d 989, 80 S. Ct. 1038 (1960) should be
noted wherein it was stated with reference to "public" trials
that:
"This is not a case where it is or could be
charged that the judge deliberately enforced secrecy
in order to be free of the safeguards of the public
scrutiny; nor is it urged that publicity would in
the slightest have effected the conduct of the proceedings or their result. Nor are we dealing with
a situation where prejudice, attributable to secrecy
is found to be sufficiently impressive to render irrelevant failure to make a timely objection at proceedings like these.'' 362 U.S. at 619, 4 L. ed 2d at
997.
Although the above-quote is referring to the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of a 1 'pub1i c" tri a 1 it shows that it is mandatory for petitioner to demonstrate evidence of prejudice in order to show the infringement of such a right.

Petitioner has not done so.

He has

not shown that he was deprived at the trial of the presence, aid, or
counsel of any person whose presence might have been of advantage to
him.
Even though there is a specific guarantee of a "public" trial
in the Sixth Amendment imposed in federal trials, as distinguished
from the more general rights guaranteed by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it is clear that even the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee is subject to restriction.

In

Geise~·

United States, 262

F. 2d 151, ret. den. 265 F. 2d, 659 (1958), cert. den. 361 U.S. 842,
4 L. ed 2d, 80, 80 S. Ct. 94, it was held that one convicted of rape
- 16 -

of an 8-year-old child could not claim that he had been denied
the "public trial'' which the Sixth Amendment guarantees, merely
because all spectators were excluded except:

(1) members of the

press, (2) members of the bar, (3) relatives or close friends of
the defendant, and (4) relatives or close friends of witnesses
whose ages were, respectively, 7 years, 9 years, and 11 years.
The court said that despite the exclusion the trial was a public
tri a 1.
And in United States y. Kobli, 172 F 2d 9J9 (1949 CA 3, Pa.)
it was held that the constitutional right to a public trial does not
require that spectators having no immediate concern with the trial be
admitted in such numbers as to overcrowd the courtroom.
Since this is a State trial, petitioner wi 11 have to demonstrate that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause guarantees
a "public" trial in state criminal prosecutions.

Assuming he can so

demonstrate, respondent contends that a "public" trial was given to
the petitioner as there was no general exclusion of the public.

Re-

spondent further alleges that if this Court finds a "public" trial
was not afforded to the petitioner, he waived such a right by not
objecting to the Court's order when it was first implemented.

Levine

v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619, 4 L. ed 2d 989, 997, 80 S. Ct.,
1038 ( 1960).
The respondent is aware that the petitioner is going to present statements to the effect that the trial judge expressed his belief in the guilt of the petitioner before the trial commenced.
Accordingly, respondent invites the Court's attention to the recent
case of Hendrix v. ~· 312 F. 2d (1962) wherein the Court of
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I

Appeals, in a habeas corpus proceeding held that the mere fact
that a trial judge in a state criminal prosecution signed a
statement in advance of trial relating to the judge's belief
that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged did not
establish any infringement of defendant's right to a fair
tri a 1.
Respectfully submitted,
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